Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Psychology evidence is an unreliable source of information about any given claimant. How then can it help decision-makers to make good decisions?
Psychology evidence paints a population-level picture. This kind of evidence can help scientists to make reliable generalizations about population-level effects. But when it comes to making predictions about individuals, even when the individual is a member of the studied population, 鈥渞easoning from the group to an individual case presents considerable challenges.鈥�1 Moreover, the field of psychology has long focused on some populations and overlooked others.2 Refugee claimants may well belong to un- or understudied populations. They may also be outliers in the data for many other reasons. As a result, psychology evidence is an unreliable source of information about how any given claimant would think or act.3
A psychological response that is remarkable in the studied populations may be unremarkable for someone like the claimant. If a decision-maker (wrongly) concludes from these studies that a claimant鈥檚 testimony is too surprising to be true, they will make one kind of mistake: rejecting true testimony on the basis of unreliable evidence.
At the same time, psychology evidence might show that, among the studied populations, a response is generally unremarkable. If so, this evidence may challenge a decision-maker鈥檚 assumption that it is too surprising to be believed. In light of this evidence, why would it be surprising for the claimant 鈥� or anyone 鈥� to think or act this way? If, in fact, the claimant is an outlier, and this response would be remarkable for someone like them, this reasoning may lead the decision-maker to make a different kind of mistake: accepting false testimony because, on the evidence before them, there is no convincing reason to reject it.
In a refugee status decision, the latter is not only the less harmful mistake 鈥� it is precisely what good legal reasoning looks like.4 By making clear when psychological responses are unremarkable 鈥� and not when they are remarkable 鈥� the Baseline Paper Series facilitates the proper use of psychology evidence in this high-stakes context.5
Why is this called the 鈥楤aseline鈥� Paper Series?
The Baseline Paper Series makes clear for decision-makers when certain ways of thinking or acting are unremarkable, unsurprising, unexceptional. It identifies psychological responses that, according to the best available evidence, are 鈥榳ell within the normal range of human experience,鈥� all else being equal. Each of the papers in this series sets a baseline: 鈥渁 known measure鈥�; 鈥渁 set of critical observations or data used for comparison鈥� 鈥渁 starting point.鈥�6 They describe a set of responses that represent neither the lower nor the upper limit of the 鈥榥ormal range鈥� 鈥� neither the floor nor the ceiling 鈥� but instead a point somewhere well within that range.
As such, this evidence will not help decision-makers to identify responses that are remarkable: outside of the normal range. Legally and logically, these papers cannot support a finding that a given claimant would (or would not) have thought or acted in a certain way. Instead, they may help decision-makers to recognize when there is no reason to assume that a claimant would (or would not) have thought or acted in a certain way. They may make clear, in other words, that a decision-maker needs to rethink or else better support the conclusion that a psychological response is too improbable to be believed.
What makes a psychological response 鈥榬emarkable鈥� or 鈥榰nremarkable鈥�?
A psychological response is remarkable if, in the populations that have been studied, it falls outside of the range of normal experience. In such a population, we would not expect to see this response occur simply because of standard variance. When a person does respond this way, we are surprised and we look for an explanation. We expect to find that there is something exceptional about the person or about the circumstances, some difference that helps to explain why their responses are different.
In contrast, a response is unremarkable if, in the populations that have been studied, it falls within the range of normal experience. In such a population, we would expect to see some people respond this way, simply because of the variety of ways that people think and act. Even if only a relatively small proportion of the population would respond this way, we expect that this kind of response will simply happen 鈥� to otherwise unexceptional people under otherwise unexceptional circumstances.
Why do we ask if a response is remarkable or unremarkable? Why not ask, instead, how likely it is?
In some contexts, to make a finding of fact, it helps to know the odds. But in other contexts, we recognize intuitively that how likely something is provides little useful information. In contrast, our sense of whether it is remarkable or unremarkable may be a helpful starting point.7
If a person claims that their favourite animal is the sugar glider, or if they claim that their favourite animal is the mosquito, in deciding whether to accept this claim, how helpful would it be to know how often these animals were identified as participants鈥� favourites in a major well-designed study? The results of such a study would probably show that even the most popular choices (dog, cat) were unlikely 鈥榦n a balance of probabilities鈥� (鈥榤ore likely than not鈥�): if chosen by less than half of the participants, 鈥榙og鈥� is less likely than 鈥榥ot dog.鈥� And given the wide range of responses, many other choices (giraffe, koala, snapping turtle, sugar glider, mosquito) will be quite unlikely (shared by only a very small proportion of the population).
Yet even if only one participant in the study chose each, and so each choice is equally (and highly) statistically unlikely, we might be tempted to conclude that 鈥業 love sugar gliders鈥� is a more likely claim than 鈥業 love mosquitos.鈥� Why? Remarkable claims (鈥榤osquito鈥�) raise doubts, not merely because of their underlying improbability, but because they violate an expectation. They run afoul of something we think we know: e.g. people do not tend to like, let alone prefer, noxious insects. Feeling that a claim is remarkable may push us to look for an explanation or corroboration. An unremarkable claim (鈥榮ugar glider鈥�) needs no explanation, however, because it accords with something we think we know: e.g. people tend to like soft little animals with big round eyes.
When the range of possibilities is highly varied (e.g. the myriad ways that humans think and behave), asking 鈥楬ow often does this kind of thing happen?鈥� is typically unhelpful, whereas asking 鈥楧oes it make sense that this would happen?鈥� can be a starting point: it can allow a decision-maker to distinguish claims that may need further explanation or corroboration (remarkable claims) from claims that do not (unremarkable ones).
Note: How reasonable this distinction will be is, of course, a separate question: this will depend entirely on the reasonableness of what the decision-maker thinks they know.
What does it mean for a response to be remarkable or unremarkable 鈥�all else being equal鈥�?
Each scenario in the Baseline Paper Series describes a way of thinking or acting that is unremarkable on its face. Knowing more about the event, the person, or their context could suggest reasons why this outcome would be more (or less) remarkable. 鈥楢ll else being equal鈥� means, however, that no other relevant information is available. On these facts alone, this outcome would be 鈥榳ell within the normal range.鈥�
References
1 D L Faigman, J Monahan & C Slobogin, 鈥淕roup to individual (G2i) inference in scientific expert testimony鈥� (2014) 81 The University of Chicago Law Review 417-480 at 420.
2 Joseph Henrich, Steven J Heine & Ara Norenzayan, 鈥淭he weirdest people in the world?鈥� (2010) 33 Behavioural and Brain Sciences 61-83, discussion 83-135; M Muthukrishna, A V Bell, J Henrich, C M Curtin, A Gedranovich, J McInerney, & B Thue, 鈥淏eyond Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of Cultural and Psychological Distance鈥� (2020) 31 Psychological Science 678鈥�701; T Pollet & TK Saxton, 鈥淗ow Diverse Are the Samples Used in the Journals Evolution & Human Behavior and Evolutionary Psychology?鈥� (2019) 5 Evolutionary Psychological Science 357鈥�368; MS Rad, AJ Martingano & J Ginges, 鈥淭oward a Psychology of Homo Sapiens: Making Psychological Science More Representative of the Human Population鈥� (2018) 115 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 11401鈥�11405.
3 H Evans Cameron, 鈥淧rincipled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers鈥� (under review, 2026).
4 H Evans Cameron, Refugee Law鈥檚 Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
5 H Evans Cameron, 鈥淧rincipled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers鈥� (under review, 2026).
6 Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 鈥榖aseline (noun)鈥�: accessed Sep 6 2026 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/baseline.
7 H Evans Cameron, 鈥淧rincipled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers鈥� (under review, 2026); H Evans Cameron, 鈥淩easoning with Probability in Truth and Deception Judgments in Refugee Status Decision-making鈥� (in progress).